Essence and Energies Summary

On ‘Essence’ and ‘Energies’

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CONTENTS:

1. Introductory metaphysics
1. Argument
2. Quotes from the Saints
2. Application to the Godhead
1. Argument
2. Quotes from the Saints
3. Further implications

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INTRODUCTORY METAPHYSICS

Metaphysics is the study of what exists, in the most abstract possible sense. One important
distinction in metaphysics is between “Essence” (called “ousia” in Greek) and “Energies”
(called “energeia” in Greek). This distinction is applicable to all beings, and plays an
important role in the theology of Eastern Christianity. The terms
‘form’ / ‘nature’ / ‘essence’ / ‘(secondary) substance’ / ‘quiddity’ all refer to the same reality,
just under different aspects; form as opposed to matter, nature as the source of action,
essence as opposed to existence, substance as opposed to accidents, quiddity as answer to the
question “What?”.

Greek distinguishes Essence (the Nature of the thing acting) from Power
(the ability of the thing to act) from Energy (the action itself) from Work
(the effect of the action).

To explain these concepts, let’s look at an example.

Imagine a sword sitting beside a fire. If we ask what a sword “is”, we would say it is a long,
straight piece of sharp metal with a handle. If we ask what a sword "does", we would say that
it cuts when applied to something soft. What it "is" (Essence) and what it "does" (Energies)
are related (it cuts because it is sharp metal) but distinct, since a small obsidian knife also
cuts, and a pipe is also a long piece of metal, but does not cut.

The fire it is sitting beside has the power, to heat and give light. While a fire is always
exercising its power, the sword does not always cut, showing that power and exercise of
power are separable. Now let's say the fire heats the sword to the point of it glowing. The
sword has been changed to be fire-like in some way, without actually being changed into fire.

Since an essence (secondary substance) defines what kind a thing is, it cannot be changed
without destroying the original object, as when wood becomes ash. Individuality (being a
specific thing of its kind; primary substance) is by definition not communicable. So there
must be some other ontological category responsible for the sharing we imagine between the
fire and the knife. This seems to be what the Palamites mean by "Energy" -- the
communicable actuality which comes after the Essence, but is not yet an external change
taking place in some other substance.

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CHURCH FATHERS

AQUINAS says in several places that we cannot know the essences of things:

● De Veritate 10.1:

"Since, however, the essences of things are not known to us, and their powers reveal
themselves to us through their acts, we often use the names of the faculties and powers
to denote the essences."

And "Since, according to the Philosopher, we do not know the substantial differences
of things, those who make definitions sometimes use accidental differences because
they indicate or afford knowledge of the essence as the proper effects afford knowledge
of a cause."

● In Posteriora Analytica 2.13.10:

"But because the essential forms are not known to us per se, they must be disclosed
through certain accidents which are signs of that form, as is stated in Metaphysics VIII."

● In De Anima 1.1.15:

"If indeed the latter could be known and correctly defined there would be no need, to
define the former; but since the essential principles of things are hidden from us we
are compelled to make use of accidental differences as indications of what is essential."

● In De Anima 2.2.237:

"And because substantial forms, including the forms of natural bodies, are not evident
to us, Aristotle makes his meaning clear with an example taken from the  (accidental)
forms of artificial."

● De Spiritualibus Creaturis 11.ad3:

"As to the third, it must be said that because substantial forms in themselves are
unknown but become known to us by their proper accidents, substantial differences
are frequently taken from accidents instead of from the substantial forms which
become known through such accidents."

● Summa Theologiae 1.77.1.ad7:

"But because substantial forms, which in themselves are unknown to us, are known
by their accidents; nothing prevents us from sometimes substituting accidents for
substantial differences."

Several other Church Fathers also indicate our inability to know the essences of things:

John of Damascus:

"For the great part the heaven is greater than the earth, but we need not investigate
the essence of the heaven, for it is quite beyond our knowledge." LINK

And: "It is evident that both sun and moon and stars are compound and liable to
corruption according to the laws of their various natures. But of their nature we are
ignorant." LINK

Basil the Great:

(Against Eunomius I.12-13, available from CUA Press, but not online. I have a picture of it
from the book on my phone, and can type it out, but the argument amounts to that
sensation is only of accidental qualities, and doesn't provide knowledge of the inner essence,
nor can the rational mind come to that essence from the accidents, as the two are not
related in a way to allow it, specifically addressing the Earth, but in the context of why we
can't know the Divine or heavenly essences.)

Gregory of Nyssa:

"And as, when looking up to heaven, and in a measure apprehending by the visual
organs the beauty that is in the height, we doubt not the existence of what we see, but
if asked what it is, we are unable to define its nature”

And, from the same, "For who is there who has arrived at a comprehension of his own
soul? Who is acquainted with its very essence, whether it is material or immaterial,
whether it is purely incorporeal, or whether it exhibits anything of a corporeal
character; how it comes into being, how it is composed, whence it enters into the body,
how it departs from it, or what means it possesses to unite it to the nature of the body;
how, being intangible and without form, it is kept within its own sphere, what
difference exists among its powers, how one and the same soul, in its eager curiosity to
know the things which are unseen, soars above the highest heavens, and again,
dragged down by the weight of the body, falls back on material passions, anger and
fear, pain and pleasure, pity and cruelty, hope and memory, cowardice and audacity,
friendship and hatred, and all the contraries that are produced in the faculties of the
soul?"

And, from the same, "Wherefore also, of the elements of the world, we know only so
much by our senses as to enable us to receive what they severally supply for our living.
But we possess no knowledge of their substance, nor do we count it loss to be ignorant
of it." LINK

And from On the Soul and Resurrection: "We hear the departure of the spirit, we
see the shell that is left; but of the part that has been separated we are ignorant, both
as to its nature, and as to the place whither it has fled; for neither earth, nor air, nor
water, nor any other element can show as residing within itself this force that has left
the body, at whose withdrawal a corpse only remains, ready for dissolution."

John Chrysostom:

"But we do not know what the essence of the sky is. If anyone should be confident that
he knows its essence and be obstinate in maintaining that he has such knowledge, let
him tell you what the essence of the sky is." LINK

And from the same, (Homily V, sometimes on Amazon or Google preview) "We do
not perfectly know the essence of the angels. Even though we seek to know their
essence ten thousand times, we cannot discover it. But why do I speak of the essence
of the angels when we do not even know well the essence of our own souls? Rather, we
do not have any knowledge whatsoever of that essence."

Aquinas (On the Creed, prologue), Basil (Letter 16), and Gregory (Against Eunomius 10.1)
all reference that we do not even know the nature of an Ant, in giving reason why we cannot
know the essence of God.

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APPLICATION TO THE GODHEAD

Aquinas, representative of the Catholic tradition, says that in God, there is active potency.
Active potency is a "potency-to-some-actuality"; the real ability to do some action, like the
ability of someone who already knows English to speak it. Second actuality is the actual
execution of the action, as when a person is currently speaking English.

All of the Divine Powers are not actualized in all possible ways, as the distinction between
what God knows and what He wills and what He creates, makes clear. So at least some of the
powers are in some ways not in second actuality, while the Divine Essence is always in all
respects in second actuality, as it is Pure Act. Because of this, the Divine Powers must be
distinct from the Divine Essence.

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CHURCH FATHERS

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA: (ca. 430)

See this section of this page, as well as this section of this page, both from his Thesaurus.

The first pair of links show him, in the context of the Godhead, saying “phusis de kai
energeia ou tauton”; "but nature and energy are not the same", which he says in order to
distinguish begetting and creating.

The second pair of links show him ascribing all definition to "ton peri tis ousian"; "what is
around the essence". This "what is around the essence" (which cannot be accident, as there
are not properly any accidental attributes to God) is what we talk about and describe, not
the essence, which means that they must be related, but not the same entirely. This is
exactly what Palamas and others defended.

Cyril clearly distinguishes the two, immediately before the first quote. He says "alla to men
poiein, energeias esti, phuseos de to gennan"; that is, "However creating is of the energy,
and generation of the nature". This will have implications later.

JOHN OF DAMASCUS: (ca. 730)

All from his Exact Exposition of the Orthodox Faith

Book I

1.4 In this section, he says:

"But all that we can affirm concerning God does not shew forth God’s nature, but only
the qualities of His nature. For when you speak of Him as good, and just, and wise,
and so forth, you do not tell God’s nature but only the qualities of His nature."

"Qualities of His Nature" here is in Greek, "ta peri ten phusin"; "what is around the
nature". This phrase, "peri ten phusin" is used by many Fathers as being truly God,
yet not the Essence of God.

1.8 In this section, he says:

"For the creation, even though it originated later, is nevertheless not derived from the
essence of God, but is brought into existence out of nothing by His will and power, and
change does not touch God’s nature. For generation means that the begetter produces
out of his essence offspring similar in essence. But creation and making mean that the
creator and maker produces from that which is external, and not out of his own
essence, a creation of an absolutely dissimilar nature"

1.9 In this section, he says:

"Each then of the affirmations about God should be thought of as signifying not what
He is in essence, but either something that it is impossible to make plain, or some
relation to some of those things which are contrasts or some of those things that follow
the nature, or an energy."

And: “Again, goodness and justice and piety and such like names belong to the
nature(1590), but do not explain His actual essence.” (Note 1590: “παρέπονται τῇ
φύσει; follow the nature, are consequents of the nature, or accompany it.”)

So he says anything positively said of God as referring not to the Divine Essence, but
to the Divine Energies. This is a distinction -- one is intelligible, the other is not, and
so they cannot be the same thing, which is why he sets the two up as a pair of
contrasts.

1.12 In this section, he says:

“The Deity being incomprehensible is also assuredly nameless. Therefore since we
know not His essence, let us not seek for a name for His essence. For names are
explanations of actual things. But God, Who is good and brought us out of nothing
into being that we might share in His goodness, and Who gave us the faculty of
knowledge, not only did not impart to us His essence, but did not even grant us the
knowledge of His essence. For it is impossible for nature to understand fully the
supernatural. Moreover, if knowledge is of things that are, how can there be
knowledge of the super-essential? Through His unspeakable goodness, then, it
pleased Him to be called by names that we could understand, that we might not be
altogether cut off from the knowledge of Him but should have some notion of Him,
however vague. Inasmuch, then, as He is incomprehensible, He is also unnameable.
But inasmuch as He is the cause of all and contains in Himself the reasons and
causes of all that is, He receives names drawn from all that is, even from opposites:
for example, He is called light and darkness, water and fire: in order that we may
know that these are not of His essence but that He is super-essential and unnameable:
but inasmuch as He is the cause of all, He receives names from all His effects.”

1.13 In this section, he says:

“That God Who is invisible by nature is made visible by His energies, we perceive from
the organisation and government of the world.”

Also in this section it is described how God's Energy is communicated, but His
Essence is not (since then all would be God-by-Nature, and no longer a creature,
destroying the creatures as such). This can only be the case if the two are distinct.

1.14 In this section, he says:

“Further the divine effulgence and energy, being one and simple and indivisible,
assuming many varied forms in its goodness among what is divisible and allotting to
each the component parts of its own nature, still remains simple and is multiplied
without division among the divided, and gathers and converts the divided into its own
simplicity…. But it is itself above mind and reason and life and essence.”

Book II

2.23 In this section, he says:

“All the faculties we have already discussed, both those of knowledge and those of life,
both the natural and the artificial, are, it is to be noted, called energies. For energy is
the natural force and activity of each essence: or again, natural energy is the activity
innate in every essence: and so, clearly, things that have the same essence have also
the same energy, and things that have different natures have also different energies.
For no essence can be devoid of natural energy.”

Book III

3.14 In this section, he says that from sameness of Energy we infer sameness of Essence --
one is recognized, and the other is only inferred, meaning they are distinct.

3.15 In this section (limited quotes, but the whole thing is worth reading), he says:

"1. Energy and 2. capacity for energy, and 3. the product of energy, and 4. the agent of
energy, are all different. 1. Energy is the efficient and essential activity of nature: 2. the
capacity for energy is the nature from which proceeds energy: 3. the product of energy
is that which is effected by energy: 4. and the agent of energy is the person or
subsistence which uses the energy."

So we see John here distinguish between nature (capacity for energy), energy (which
proceeds from the nature), product (the result of the activity), as well as from
person/hypostasis.

"In connection with our Lord Jesus Christ, the power of miracles is the energy of His
divinity, while the work of His hands and the willing and the saying, I will, be thou
clean, are the energy of His humanity. And as to the effect, the breaking of the loaves,
and the fact that the leper heard the “I will,” belong to His humanity, while the
multiplication of the loaves and the purification of the leper belong to His divinity.
For through both, that is through the energy of the body and the energy of the soul,
He displayed one and the same, cognate and equal divine energy. For just as we saw
that His natures were united and permeate one another, and yet do not deny that
they are different but even enumerate them, although we know they are inseparable,
so also in connection with the wills and the energies we know their union, and we
recognise their difference and enumerate them without introducing separation. For
just as the flesh was deified without undergoing change in its own nature, in the same
way also will and energy are deified without transgressing their own proper limits."

Here he specifically calls the Divine Energy the Divine Power. The power (first
actuality) of miracles is called the Divine energy, and this is then distinguished
from the effect (second actuality), which is the actual multiplication of loaves or
purification of the leper.

And: "We must, then, maintain that Christ has two energies in virtue of His double
nature. For things that have diverse natures, have also different energies, and things
that have diverse energies, have also different natures. And so conversely, things that
have the same nature have also the same energy, and things that have one and the
same energy have also one and the same essence, which is the view of the Fathers,
who declare the divine meaning."  

And: "For all energy is the effect of power. But it cannot be that uncreated and created
nature have one and the same nature or power or energy."

Now if, with respect to the uncreated (that is, the Divine alone), John says, after
quoting St. Gregory of Nyssa (and soon adding more supporting quotes), that,
"energy is the effect of power", then he is stating that in God there is some power
which has causal priority to some energy which is also uncreated.

And (with regards to the miracle of raising the daughter of Jairus) "The effect of His
human energy was His taking the child by the hand and drawing her to Himself; while
that of His divine energy was the restoring of her to life"

Again showing that the effect of the energy was the "restoring" (which we would consider
the action taking place in the girl) -- which means that the energy itself must be causally
prior to the effect which takes place in a created being.

And: "If Christ our Master has one energy, it must be either created or uncreated; for
between these there is no energy, just as there is no nature. If, then, it is created, it
will point to created nature alone, but if it is uncreated, it will betoken uncreated
essence alone. For that which is natural must completely correspond with its nature:
for there cannot exist a nature that is defective. But the energy that harmonises with
nature does not belong to that which is external: and this is manifest because, apart
from the energy that harmonises with nature, no nature can either exist or be known.
For through that in which each thing manifests its energy, the absence of change
confirms its own proper nature."

And: "If all energy is defined as essential movement of some nature, as those who are
versed in these matters say, where does one perceive any nature that has no
movement, and is completely devoid of energy, or where does one find energy that is
not movement of natural power? But, as the blessed Cyril says, no one in his senses
could admit that there was but one natural energy of God and His creation."

Which further show us that there is a Divine, Uncreated, energy which is an effect of the
nature, but not external to it.

3.28 In this section, he says:

“He, therefore, assumed the whole man, even the fairest part of him, which had
become diseased, in order that He might bestow salvation on the whole. And, indeed,
there could never exist a mind that had not wisdom and was destitute of knowledge.
For if it has not energy or motion, it is utterly reduced to nothingness.”

BASIL: (ca. 370)

In Letter 234, he says:

"The operations are various, and the essence simple, but we say that we know our God
from His operations, but do not undertake to approach near to His essence. His
operations come down to us, but His essence remains beyond our reach."

Or from the same letter: “But God, he [a Eunomian] says, is simple, and whatever
attribute of Him you have reckoned as knowable is of His essence. But the absurdities
involved in this sophism are innumerable.”

Against Eunomius (available from Amazon or via LibGen):

1.8 p101

“For if he [Eunomius] does not consider anything at all by way of conceptualization so as to
avoid the appearance of honoring God with human designations, then he will confess this:
that all things attributed to God similarly refer to his substance. But how is it not ridiculous
to say that his creative power is his substance? Or that his providence is his substance? Or
the same for his foreknowledge? In other words, how is it not ridiculous to regard every
activity of his as his substance?”

1.12 p109 -- 1.14 p113

He talks about how even the element “earth” is not known to us in its essence, much less
that of God, and then also says this:

“It is to be expected that the very substance of God is incomprehensible to everyone
except the Only-Begotten and the Holy Spirit. But we are led up from the activities of
God and gain knowledge of the Maker through what he has made, and So Come in
this way to an understanding of his goodness and wisdom.”

1.20

"Now that we have determined in what way we need to understand the commonality of
the substance, let's closely examine what comes next to see if it has any connection
with what came before. He says: "it is due to order and to superiorities based on time
that the one is a first and the other a second." In the case of things whose substance is
common, why is it necessary for them to be subject to order and to be secondary to
time? For it is impossible that the God of the universe has not co-existed from eternity
with his image who has radiated light non-temporally, that he does not have a
connection with him that is not only beyond time but also beyond all ages. And so he
is called the radiance [Heb 1.3] that we may understand his connection, and the
character of his subsistence [Heb 1.3] that we may learn that he is of the same
substance.

“Furthermore, there is an order which is natural and another which comes about by
deliberation. On the one hand, order is natural when it is a question of the order which
is arranged for created beings according to the rationales of their creation, the position
of countables, and the relation of causes to their effects. (Now it has already been
agreed upon that God is Maker and Creator of nature itself.) On the other hand, order
comes about by deliberation and art when it is a question of structures that are built,
subjects of learning, logical propositions, and such things. But Eunomius concealed
the first kind of order and mentioned only the second kind, saying that one ought not
to posit order in the case of God since "order is secondary to the orderer." He has
either not understood or purposely concealed the fact that there is a kind of order
which is not established by our imposing it but which is found in the natural sequence
of things. An example of the latter is the kind of order between fire and the light which
comes from it. In these cases we say that the cause is prior and that which comes from
it is secondary. We do not separate these things from one another by an interval, but
through reasoning we conceptualize the cause as prior to the effect. So, then, in the
case of things in which there is a prior and a secondary, how is it reasonable to deny
that there is an order which exists not by our imposing it, but from the natural
sequence that exists in them?

“Why, then, does he refuse to accept that there is order in God? He thinks that if he
has demonstrated that priority in God is conceivable in no other way, then he is
demonstrating that the only remaining option is that God has pre-eminence according
to the substance itself. But we say that the Father is ranked prior to the Son in terms
of the relation that causes have with what comes from them, not in terms of a
difference of nature or a pre-eminence based on time. Otherwise, we will deny even
the very fact that God is the Father since difference in substance precludes their
natural connection."

2.3 p134 -- 2.4 p135

He talks about how names do not tell us about substance, but rather hypostasis, as even
names based on actions are specific to that person.

2.29 p176

“But if we were to posit, on the one hand, the light or the life or the good as the substance of
God, claiming that the very thing which God is is life as a whole, light as a whole, and good
as a whole, while positing, on the other hand, that the life has unbegottenness as a
concomitant, then how is the one who is simple in substance not incomposite? For surely the
ways of indicating his distinctive feature will not violate the account of simplicity. Otherwise,
all the things said about God will indicate to us that God is composite. And so, it seems that if
we are going to preserve the notion of simplicity and partlessness, there are two options.
Either we will not claim anything about God except that he is unbegotten, and we will refuse
to name him 'invisible,' 'incorruptible,' 'immutable,' 'creator,' Judge,' and all the names we
now use to glorify him. Or, if we do admit these names, what will we make of them? Shall we
apply all of them to the substance? If so, we will demonstrate not only that he is composite,
but also that he is compounded from unlike parts, because different things are signified by
each of these names.”

2.32 p180-181

“ First of all, how is it possible to reason back from created works to substance? This is
something which I for my part fail to see. For things which have been made are indicative of
power and wisdom and skill, but not of the substance itself. Furthermore,

they do not even necessarily communicate the entire power of the creator, seeing that the
artisan can at times not put his entire strength into his activities; rather, he frequently
attenuates his exertions for the products of his art. But if he were to set

his whole power into motion for his product, even in this case it would be his strength that
could be measured by means of his products, not his substance that could be comprehended,
whatever it may be. If, because of the simplicity and incompositeness of the divine nature,
Eunomius were to posit that the substance is concurrent with the power, and if, because of
the goodness that belongs to God, he were to say that the whole power of the Father has been
set into motion for the begetting of the Son, and the

whole power of the Only-Begotten for the constitution of the Holy Spirit, so that one may
consider the power of the Only Begotten simultaneously with his substance on the basis of the
Spirit, and comprehend the power of the Father and his substance on the basis of the
Only-Begotten, note what the consequence of this is. The very points he uses to try to confirm
the unlikeness of the substance actually confirm its likeness! For

if the power has nothing in common with the substance, how could he be led from the created
works, which are the effects of power, to the comprehension of the substance? But if power
and substance are the same thing, then that which characterizes

the power will also completely characterize the substance. Hence the created works will not
bring one to the unlikeness of substance, as you say, but rather to the exactness of the
likeness. So, once again, this attempt confirms our account rather than his. Either there is no
basis on which to demonstrate his claims, or, if he were to draw his images from human
affairs, he would discover that it is not from the products of the artisan that we comprehend
the artisan's substance, but that it is from that which has been begotten that we come to know
the nature of the begetter. After all, it is impossible to comprehend the substance of the house
builder from the house. But on the basis of that which is begotten it is easy to conceive of the
nature of the begetter. Consequently, if the Only-Begotten is a created work, he does not
communicate to us the substance of the Father. But if he makes the Father known to us
through himself, he is not a created work but rather the true Son, the image of Cod
[2 Cor 4.4], and the character of his subsistence [Col 1.15]. So much for this subject.”

3.2 p188

“ Furthermore, when iron is placed in the middle of fire, while it does not cease to be iron, it
is nonetheless inflamed by the intense contact with the fire and admits the entire nature of
fire into itself. And so in both outward appearance and activity the iron is transformed into
fire. Likewise, the holy powers, from their communion with that which is holy by nature,
possess a holiness that pervades their whole subsistence, and they become connatural with
that which is holy by nature. The holy powers and Holy Spirit differ in this regard: for the
latter, holiness is nature, whereas for the former, being made holy comes from participation.
Those for whom the good is adventitious and introduced from another possess a nature that
can change.”

GREGORY OF NYSSA: (ca. 380)

Against Eunomius

Book I, Section 17, final paragraph, sentences 2 and 3:

"We say a man works in iron, or in wood, or in anything else. This single expression
conveys at once the idea of the working and of the artificer, so that if we withdraw the
one, the other has no existence."

Here he distinguishes "the working" from "the artificer", and yet states that "if we withdraw
one, the other has no existence". So we see that the (in this case) person and their energy are
distinct. In the case of the Godhead, which has eternal existence, by his principle, so the
energy must also be eternal.

Book 7, Section 5, first paragraph, about halfway in:

"As, then, when we are taught by David that God is a judge, or patient, we do not learn
the Divine essence, but one of the attributes which are contemplated in it, so in this
case too when we hear of His being not generated, we do not by this negative
predication understand the subject, but are guided as to what we must not think
concerning the subject, while what He essentially is remains as much as ever
unexplained."

Here he states again that both positive and negative attributes are "predicates" which do
not allow us to know "the subject" or "the Divine Essence". Yet he is using them to refer to
God, all the same. So there must be some aspect of God which is not the Essence, but is
Divine all the same. This is the Energies.

See also: Book 2, Section 3,

And his Homily on the Beatitudes: VI

AGATHO: (ca. 670)

Letter from the Sixth Ecumenical Council:

“For when we confess two natures and two natural wills, and two natural operations in
our one Lord Jesus Christ, we do not assert that they are contrary or opposed one to
the other (as those who err from the path of truth and accuse the apostolic tradition of
doing.  Far be this impiety from the hearts of the faithful!), nor as though separated
(per se separated) in two persons or subsistences, but we say that as the same our
Lord Jesus Christ has two natures so also he has two natural wills and operations, to
wit, the divine and the human:  the divine will and operation he has in common with
the coessential Father from all eternity:  the human, he has received from us, taken
with our nature in time.  
This is the apostolic and evangelic tradition, which the spiritual mother of your most
felicitous empire, the Apostolic Church of Christ, holds.”

And: “Since, as the truth of the Christian faith holds, the will is natural, where the one
nature of the holy and inseparable Trinity is spoken of, it must be consistently
understood that there is one natural will, and one natural operation.  But when in
truth we confess that in the one person of our Lord Jesus Christ the mediator between
God and men, there are two natures (that is to say the divine and the human), even
after his admirable union, just as we canonically confess the two natures of one and
the same person, so too we confess his two natural wills and two natural operations.”

And: “If therefore he had a divine and a deified will, he had also two wills.  For what is
divine by nature has no need of being deified; and what is deified is not truly divine by
nature.”

And: “For it is impossible and contrary to the order of nature that there should be a
nature without a natural operation:  and even the heretics did not dare to say this,
although they were, all of them, hunting for human craftiness and cunning questions
against the orthodoxy of the faith, and arguments agreeable to their depravities.”

And: “For which reason we rightly believe that that same person, since he is one, has
two natural operations, to wit, the divine and the human, one uncreated, and the other
created, as true and perfect God and as true and perfect man, the one and the same,
the mediator between God and men, the Lord Jesus Christ.  Wherefore from the
quality of the operations there is recognized a difference void of offence of the natures
which are joined in Christ through the hypostatic union.”

And: “For how is it possible not to acknowledge in him two wills, to wit, a human and
a divine, when in him, even after the inseparable union, there are two natures
according to the definitions of the synods?”

MAXIMOS THE CONFESSOR (ca. 650)

(Questions to Thalassos, in Greek and Latin, p319, halfway into line three from top)
Maximos says that our person is deified in all but essence. If not essence, but also not
energy, there can be no Deification. And if human nature is made truly Divine in energy,
then the energy is shareable in a way the essence is not, meaning they are not the same.

GREGORY OF NAZIANZUS: (ca. 380)

Fifth Theological Oration: Section VI (tangentially related)

---

IMPLICATIONS

Filioque

Either the Person of the Spirit is from the Father alone, the Son alone, the Father and
Son as from two principles, or the Father and Son as one principle. The Orthodox view
is that the Spirit proceeds from the Father alone.

This is manifest because the characteristics and actions of the Persons of the Trinity
arise either from Essence or Person, since there are no other qualities to differentiate
them (whereas two identical twins are still never in the same exact spot, and one can
be dirty and the other clean, etc.). If the Procession of the Spirit is from the Essence,
then it would be the Spirit's own essence from which it proceeds, which is absurd, as it
cannot be its own cause and not its own cause at the same time, and it cannot cause
itself to exist prior to it existing.
Therefore the Procession is from the Person.

But reviewing the possible Personal origins of the Spirit, either the Father and Son
both share a quality because of their common Essence, or they have the quality
uniquely, as only the Son was incarnate, and only the Father is uncaused in any sense,
whereas the Son is begotten. But if the Father and Son together share a quality which
the Spirit lacks (so that the Spirit may Proceed from them “as from one principle” as
the [Catholic] Second Council of Lyons and the [Catholic] Council of Florence both
stated), this necessarily entails that the two have a different Essence from the Spirit,
because, as John of Damascus says, "Things that have diverse natures, have also
different energies, and things that have diverse energies, have also different natures.
And so conversely, things that have the same nature have also the same energy, and
things that have one and the same energy have also one and the same essence, which
is the view of the Fathers, who declare the divine meaning." It is clear that if the
Father and Son are capable of causing the existence of another divine Person, but the
Spirit is not, that the difference in abilities means the Spirit doesn't have the same
Powers as do the other two, which proves it would have a different Essence, just as we
know a human is not a bird because it is unable to fly like they can.
So the Spirit cannot Proceed from the two “as from one principle”.

So we are left either with a procession from the Father alone or the Son alone, and it
is apparent that no one has maintained that the Spirit proceeds from the Son alone,
for this again would take from the Father His distinguishing quality as the Uncaused
Cause of all else, which requires that we believe the Spirit proceeds according to His
Person from the Person of the Father alone, in a manner different from the Begetting
of the Son, though, as the Damascene says, "we have learned that there is a difference
between generation and procession, but the nature of that difference we in no wise
understand".

Papacy

If the office of the episcopate and the person exercising the office are identified, then
the charism of the office (to interpret spiritual matters) becomes applied to the person
as such. This perhaps played a role in the development of the notion of Papal
Infallibility.

Beatific Vision

In the Catholic view, the Divine Energies and the Divine Essence are identical. Either
humans have participation in God as their eternal destiny or not. If we do, then this
means that humans receive the Divine Essence. But this is impossible without the
destruction of human beings as human (it would either be like a reverse Incarnation or
some kind of Nirvana-like subsuming into the Godhead and loss of personhood). If we
do not, then we are eternally separated from God by the Created-Uncreated divide.
However, if the Divine Energies and the Divine Essence are not identical, then we may
participate in the Divine Energies without encountering the problem that participation
in an essence brings up.
This is the teaching of Orthodoxy.

Thinking of our original example, let's say God is like fire, and we are like the sword.
The sword cannot become fire. Nor can fire become the sword. But fire, which gives off
heat and light, can give the ability to give off heat and light to a sword placed in it,
without changing the sword's natural cutting ability. Similarly, while we cannot
become God in Essence, we can take on some of His Energies like the sword takes on
some of the fire's traits. Our participation in the Energies of God is called “Grace”.

Solidarity Party for the Common Good

SOLIDARITY AND THE COMMON GOOD

            I am proud to say that I am a member of the Solidarity Party, and I wanted to write about the reason why it is important that the name ‘Solidarity Party’ was chosen. Solidarity is the heart of our Party, and it is the heart of any rightful political action. It will be good to do this by examining the goal of politics; the Common Good.

            The Common Good of a nation, state, or community is the highest earthly good and condition of wellbeing of that community. While it includes spirituality, it does not include spiritual goods, because an earthly institution cannot give spiritual goods. Taken this way, we can say that the Common Good is really a group of goods which cannot exist by themselves in their best forms, and necessarily include those things which make for the wellbeing of each person, family, and association, as these come before political groups. Some of the main facets of the Common Good, then, are marriage, life, liberty, knowledge, wealth, and governing institutions, because these are needed by all people in order to live well and in peace.

            In the same way that the Common Good is composed of several individual goods, so the means to achieve the Common Good come in several forms. Among these are welfare programs that provide food, water, shelter, clothing, and healthcare, environmental protections, military defense, schools, institutions which promote financial wellbeing for all, infrastructure, and a criminal justice system.

            Uniquely part of both the goods and the means to achieve them are the virtues. These virtues include the classical cardinal virtues of self-discipline, courage, wisdom, and justice, because they allow a person to act rightly. Cultivating virtue is a crucial task for any community, for this very reason, and losing sight of the value of these virtues can be disastrous.

            If we were to bring together both the goods and means described above, we would find that the collection is quite similar to the Preamble of the Constitution, which states the goal of the Founders was to "form a more perfect union,” and that to do this they would need to, “establish justice, insure domestic tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity". The Common Good was here acknowledged to be the goal they had in mind.

            The Common Good is not talked about much in the news. But social justice is a regular phrase. Social justice means many things to many people, but following with the classical definition of justice as a virtue (“the will to give to each what they deserve”), social justice could be defined as, “the will to give to each what they deserve as a society”, or perhaps, “the will to work for the Common Good [with others],” because the Common Good is something that all people deserve.

            Solidarity, which was once defined as the “firm and persevering determination to commit oneself to the Common Good”, seems to match nearly exactly the definition of social justice as given above. Given that definition, the virtue of Solidarity is the most directly connected with the Common Good of all the virtues. Solidarity is not mere empathy, nor radicalized protests, but the hard-working commitment to ensure a condition in which all people are able to live well to the best of our earthly ability to provide it for them. We all live in society, and we all benefit when these good things are properly ensured.

            This commitment to Solidarity is the core value of our Party because Solidarity defines a citizenry with the character to strengthen their country. Wealth, power, and knowledge alone are not enough to ensure a healthy nation for our children, because all of these can be abused and hoarded. If we commit ourselves to working together and to the Common Good of all, then we will find soon enough that the rest will follow.

            I’m proud to be a member of a Party that still speaks the language of virtue, and that still has a vision beyond the “us-against-them” campaigning we’ve seen recently. Let’s continue to work together to make our families, communities, and political groups stronger. Let’s continue to remember the value of Solidarity.

Justice

The Species of Justice

"[Let us] hold firm to the Way of Heaven and always pursue Justice and Virtue, 

remembering the soul is immortal and can endure all kinds of good and evil. 

In this way, we will live dear to each other and to the gods, 

both during our mortal life here and after when we, 

like champions who receive their gifts, 

obtain our reward.

--Plato, Republic, final paragraph

"Justice" can have several meanings, depending on the context:

1. Commutative justice as a virtue, regarding interpersonal actions.

Defined as "the will to render to each individual their due".

This is explored at length by Aristotle.

2. Social justice as a virtue, more specific in meaning than common use.

Defined as "the will to work for the common good by working with others".

This use is distinct from the others, as it is not coercive.

Social justice instead works through free associations.

Social justice is therefore the form of Justice most like 'Caritas'.

3. Legal justice as a virtue, paired with Distributive.

Defined as "the will to obey what the State legitimately commands".

4. Distributive justice of the State, as paired with Legal.

Defined as "the duty of the State to give its citizens their due".

Distributive Justice can be broken down into rewards and punishments.

These two divisions can then be further distinguished by the means of determination:

      REWARDS

• Equal:  All are equally human, and should receive equal support.
• Need:  Those most in need should receive the most support.
• Merit:  Those most worthy should receive the most support.

      PUNISHMENTS

• Procedural:  All are equal before the law, and should receive equal penalty.
• Corrective:  Those involved should receive what the crime shows they need.
• Restorative:  (For the victim, compensation.)
• Therapeutic:  (For the criminal, treatment.)
• Retributive:  The punishment should fit the crime in severity.

5. Justice as Harmony in the political unit.

This use is the sum total of all four above.

This is explored at length by Plato.

Our Triple-Trinitarian Psychology

Based especially on some reading I have done with the Hesychastic Saints of the Orthodox Church,
I put this image of what seems to be the overall view of the soul that they have.
(Not included are the animal motor and vegetative powers of the soul, as they do not pertain to conscious experience as internal processes.)


("Nous" is the "spiritual sense", "Logos" is the "spiritual intelligence", and "Pneuma" is the "spiritual passion"; they are also called "Intellect", "Reason", and "Spirit", respectively, but these terms have been avoided to ensure clear distinction from the non-spiritual intelligence and passions.)


Comments are welcome!

On Abortion

As a result of some recent discussion with a colleague, I decided to post this:

Either a fetus is a human organism or it is not.
If it is not, it must be explained what it is, since it very apparently is human from its genetic content, and it is clearly an organism, rather than an organ or other tissue which constitute part of another organism, simply working from a medical perspective.
That the fetus is inside another organism does not change this fact, just as a parasite is still its own organism despite being in the body of its host.
So it seems the fetus is a human organism.

Either a fetus is a human person, or it is not.
If it is not, it must be explained what it is, since it very apparently is human from its genetic content, and it appears to be a person in the sense of being a human organism which lives in the community of other persons by whom it is shaped and whom it, in turn, shapes in some ways.
That the fetus is incapable of speech or voluntary motion does not change this fact, just as a sleeping person or someone with a disability is still a human person, despite also lacking such abilities at the moment of consideration. *
So it seems a fetus is a human person.

Either it is morally permissible to kill another human (considered as organism or as person; it is irrespective) &/or allow the human to be killed, or it is not.
If it is not, then abortion is also morally impermissible, as a case of killing a human. X

If it sometimes is morally permissible to kill another human, *

Either it is always permissible or else it is only sometimes permissible .
If it is always permissible, society would collapse. But humans are social beings by nature.
So it seems killing another human is not always morally permissible, but only sometimes.

Either killing is sometimes permissible due to the humanity of the victim, or else due to something added to it.
If it is due to humanity, then as the humanity is the same for all humans, being what makes them human, it would be always permissible. But this is contrary to the previous conclusion.
So it seems it is due to something added to the humanity of the victim.

Of things added to a nature, there are (1) quantity, (2) quality, (3) relation, (4) time, (5) location,  (6) position, (7) action, (8) reception, and (9) state. These, applied to humans, can be reduced to the more general labels of (A) condition (1, 2, 8, 9), (B) situation (3, 4, 5, 6), or (C) consequence (7).

Either a consequence is the result of voluntary action or it is not.
If it is not, then it seems wrong to punish such an accident with death, even in the most severe cases, unless that accident was the result of previous action which was voluntary, as in the case of drunk driving or poor safety measures in a workplace. Even then, the death penalty may be extremely rare.
So it seems that only voluntary action can be a circumstance in which killing is morally permissible, but this is clearly something a fetus is incapable of, and this was stated earlier in the argument. X *

Either a situation is the result of voluntary action (consequence) or it is not.
If it is not, then it seems morally permissible to kill another only to save the lives of others--and even this causes sharp division among even philosophers of ethics, and may depend on precise details of the situation.
If it is, voluntary action has been already discussed. X
So while there may be a case in which a situation makes killing morally permissible if it is to save the lives of others, even this is unclear. ~~~

Either a condition is the result of voluntary action, or it is not.
If it is not, then it seems the one in the condition is innocent, and themselves a victim of external forces.
If it is, voluntary action has already been discussed. X
So it remains to be ascertained, following the same line of thought as in the treatment of situation, when it is morally permissible to kill someone who is innocent.

Either harm is being (or going to be) caused, or it is not.
If it is not, then there would seem to be no reason to kill the innocent except out of desire for killing, for its own sake. But this is utterly morally repugnant and to assert this as an acceptable reason seems little different from the assertion that killing is always morally permissible, as to kill for its own sake is to kill because of the life of the thing killed, which is always present before the act would be committed.
So unless there will be harm done by the victim, they ought not be killed. X

Either the harm which would be caused is (considered to be) to the point of death, or it is not.
If it is not, then it would seem that as possession of any good is predicated on the possessor living, the loss of any good is not enough to merit that another be killed. X
So it seems that only harm (considered to be) to the point of death might merit that the innocent be killed to save the other.

So unless the life of the mother is in danger, abortion is utterly morally impermissible by the same standards that govern killing in general.


*
Axiom 1. Fetuses are incapable of voluntary acts.
To deny this is to assert fetuses are capable of voluntary acts, which remains to be shown, and then requires a further development of "abortion as punishment".
Axiom 2. Killing is sometimes morally permissible, though not always.
To deny this is to assert either killing is always permissible, which is stupid, or to assert killing is never permissible, which would also rule out abortion.
Axiom 3. Death is only possibly merited by an involuntary act when it would prevent another death.
To deny this is to assert that preventing some harm less than death merits killing, but the position then needs to be developed more clearly and fully, and it appears liable to becoming an assertion that causing discomfort is grounds for being killed.

Why Does a Loving God Permit Bad Things to Happen to Innocent Persons?

(originally from something written up for a class)

In matters of fine distinctions, when the terms used in the discussion are themselves matters of contention, a definition must be supplied in order to ensure it is, in fact, the same idea being discussed. The terms here are "love", "God", "permission", "bad thing", "innocence", and "person".

Love is the will for the good of another. This includes both the wish and the pursuit of that good, though sometimes only the wish is possible. What is the good of another is that which allows the other to most fully be what and who they are. Because all persons share the "what" (human nature), we all share some goods (food, water, clothing, loving care, etc), but because each person is a unique "who", there are also unique goods which may apply to some persons and not to others (that particular job, this specific house, knowing that specific thing on the test, etc.). So there is a general love for humanity and a specific love of persons. Love, being an act of will regarding the good as abstracted most fully, is an act only rational beings can perform, as reason is that faculty which allows a being to most fully abstract a quality from the material, sensory inputs from which the idea springs. Further, to love is an act in one's own interest as well, because a person as "I" is defined in contradistinction to a "You". And if a person is necessarily only able to self-conceptualize with reference to another, the other is a necessary part of the self, because that other makes the self to be who it is. To summarize, love is identification of oneself with another and the rational desire that they be the best other person they can be.

God, most truly, is beyond words, being something like the Tao of Lao-Tzu, the pre-rational foundation for reason. But as the cause of all things, God is also, as though by analogy, the maximal Being. In this sense, God is Good Itself, Truth Itself, Beauty Itself, Life Itself, perfect Unity and Infinitude. By virtue of the Unity of the Being of God, so also is the Act of God singular--the bestowal of being on all created things. This single act has a different effect on all beings, as the shining sun has a different effect on wax, clay, grapes, and solar panels, not because it differs in act, but because the objects of the act differ in potentialities. It can also be seen that such a singluar Act is capable of the formation of a diversity of such objects of its continued Act when one considers the Big Bang cosmological theory, by which it is said that a single point of energy burst forth and gave rise to the universe in which we presently find ourselves. The two might even be one and the same Act--but this is another matter. In any case, God is also perfect Mind. This is clear because God is posited to be the creator of all material things, thus being Itself Immaterial (often called "Spiritual" in contrast; this is also the reason it is Timeless/"Eternal"), and the only immaterial reality we seem to encounter with causal powers in the world is the human mind. Further, the Act of God is to sustain the being of all created things as the things they are. To do this implies that God has, in some way, the form or nature of all things within Itself, since the cause of something seems to contain, even if not in exactly the same way, the effect in itself, as fire heats things because it is hot and the pen writes because it has ink in it and I speak words because I have internal words (thoughts). And the only immaterial reality we encounter that has forms or natures of things in itself is the human mind. Finally, because there are truths which would remain true even if all living things were to die suddenly, there must be a Mind to contemplate these truths. If a tree falls in the woods, you better believe it makes a sound no matter if someone hears it. A triangle with a right angle in it will still have sides related to each other according to the Pythagorean Theorem regardless of if no human is around to know that. But to say "the relationship between sides holds true in the things themselves" does not answer this objection which intends to show that God is a Mind, because the existence of the relationships is not the sames as the propositions being true--as they are--and this status of "truth" applied to a proposition is a claim about the relation of an abstracted relationship, not the relation of the things in themselves (since no physical triangle is actually perfect according to mathematical proportions). Therfore, God is a Mind which created all things and sustains their existence by a single Act, being the perfect and One archetype of all good qualities. (As an extra note, it is this trinity of Existence, Form, and Act which seems to parallel the NeoPlatonic One, Mind, and Soul, as well as the Christian Being [Father], Word [Son], and Will [Spirit].)

Permission is the absence of action by the one permitting when an action could be taken by them to prevent the action they are permitting. Applied specifically to a rational being, this is to deliberately not intervene.

By "bad things", we can mean a great number of different groups of things. There are unpleasant things (things which appear to be lacking some good quality), obstacles (things which prevent us from acquiring something with good qualities), and things which cause harm (removing good qualities from ourselves). Further, the term "bad things" can refer to acts. For this topic, we can collapse acts and beings into one analysis. Among the three categories of bad things, not all seem equal, and many seem mixed. Getting a vaccination seems good, but not to the baby who receives it. Vegetables are good, but not in the mind of the child made to eat them. Study is good, but not to the college kid who wants to do something more fun. Etc. In all these cases, there are mixed qualities, but it seems the greater weight is to be placed on the good. This implies that goods which allow us to become more fully what we are (medicine to prevent disease killing us, food to keep us healthy and active, and education to allow us to act wisely and make things) outweigh the bad qualities we endure to have them (pain, bad taste, inability to go out with friends sometimes). Sometimes, though not even close to always, we find a kind of goodness even in the bad qualities of what we have to endure, like enjoying the burn from a workout, being satisfied with a paper all the more because of the effort put into it, or laughing over a campfire about some stupid thing you did when you were younger to impress someone you liked--that worked. We recognize the bad quality of all these things, the pain, the inability, the hard work, the embarassment, etc., but they seem allowable, expected, and reasonable. They are "worth it", and are seen as the only way to be able to have to good thing we want. After all, if you want to be up in a tree or at the top of a mountain, you have to climb or have someone or something do so for you. But there are bad things which are not like that. Serious illness, death, abuse, starvation, shaming, etc. These are not worth it, and seem to have no such value. Further, there are some goods like human life and dignity which seem to be without "greater good", at least among human concerns. And this is why the atrocities of genocide and other unspeakable things are not tolerable even for some "greater good" of genetic purity, national economic standing, etc. And the reason is apparent when considered in light of the previous statement: "goods which allow us to become more fully what we are outweigh the bad qualities we endure to have them". It makes no sense to have a good above the personal well-being, since it is the goal of all action, itself. Therefore a truly bad thing is something which would prevent a person from becoming their best self.

Innocence is a term meaning lack of culpability in performing some bad thing. To be culpable is to be owed a punishment. What is "owing" is what we expect to occur, as in "you ought to pay your debts [given societal morals and possible consequences]" or "it ought to rain today [since it usually rains every so often and hasn't in a while, and especially since the weatherman said it would]". A punishment is some bad thing (not necessarily a "bad-thing" as defined above) that comes upon someone as a result of their action, as in "he was punished by hanging [because he killed the sheriff]" or "the road punished that boarder [because he didn't wear a helmet and isn't very good at skating]". Though usually we mean a punishment to be something inflicted by a rational agent. So innocence is a state in which one would expect nothing bad to happen to the person as a result of their behavior. More specified to the context of societal enforcement, this would mean that innocence is a state of being in which a person has not acted in a way warranting punishment.

Person has been defined above (and again here more clearly) as a rational being living in relation to another such being.

So restated, we are asking: "How can a Mind which created all things and sustains their existence by a single Act, being the perfect and One archetype of all good qualities, identifying Itself with other rational beings, and desiring that they be the best other persons they can be, deliberately not intervene when something which would prevent them from becoming their best selves happens to them, when their actions have not warranted punishment?"

To this, there may be several answers, some of which simply deny the question even is the right one to ask.

One, God's desire for our good may not be the only desire God has, and the other(s) might outweigh the desire for our good. This is often the view expressed in Reformed Churches, where the glory or fame of God is considered to be a higher priority.

Two, the desire for our good as persons may itself limit God, since to be a person is to be a rational agent, and to be rational is to have free will. Our having free will would then be something God would be unwilling to compromise, similar to the genocide example above; it would be destroying the very reason for doing it. Further, to love requires a free act of will, and this seems central to this will for our own personal flourishing that God has.

(Note also that since God is that which sustains the being of all things, Itself perfect Being and Good, and our own greatest good is to be most what we are, we seem to be saying that complete being and perfect good are in some way equivalent. These equivalent qualities, being and good (and some people include unity, beauty, thing-ness, etc.) are called "metaphysical transcendentals" or "convertibles", and by "converting" the one into the other in our statement about God's sustaining all things in being, we can say that since the principle act of a rational being is "to freely will", and good is convertible with being, God "freely wills the good of all things"; that, you'll note, is equivalent, per the above definition, with saying, "God loves all things". God wishes we all become the best selves we can be, simply because that is the nature of God, to love.)

Then we begin to consider the ways in which the question can have some part denied. I'll only examine single parts being denied at a time.

Three, one could deny that there is a God. But then one can't blame God any more than they can the Berenstein Bears for the evil in the world. And it seems I've met more than a few people who blame Someone they claim they don't believe exists to be blamed. But I've also met some who have genuinely not blamed either God or the Bears for the evils of the world.

Four, one could deny the definition of God given above. But that would take a very long time to refute in the myriad ways it could be denied. So I'm not going to go there.

(Further note the self-identification of God with humans seemingly hints at a God-becoming-human-ing, which is, of course, the doctrine of the Incarnation.)

Five, one could deny the definition of love given. But the competing defintions would seem to be physical desire, friendship, familiarity, and sacrifice. Physical desire might be an effect of love at times, but often it is a symptom of something quite separate. Friendship seems to be usually among equals. While this is possible if the Incarnation is accepted, God in Itself is radically unlike humanity in every way. Further, non-equal friendship seems to be based on common pursuit of something, whether business or sport or something else. But here I have already shown God to be in common pursuit with us of our own becoming our best self, and so in this way, friendship with God is possible, and already included. Familiarity is largely treated in what was said of friendship, and this seems to have its primary basis among humans in biological similarity, something again impossible to share with God unless some kind of an Incarnation is believed to have taken place, and further, that in the context of a human family, with whom He might be similar and familiar. Finally, sacrifice seems to mean giving up some good for the sake of the good of another. But God is Good unto Itself. So this is impossible. However, were there to be, as has been mentioned several times now, a radical self-identification with humanity in the form of an Incarnation, then there could be, both really in physical terms, and analogically by participation in the Incarnate Person, divine terms, some kind of Sacrifice for mankind. But of course, this is the doctrine of Kenosis and the Crucifixion, and possibly the Eucharist, depending on the denomination.

(I do not mean to use only Christian examples of groups with such beliefs, it's just that I know considerably more about them than I do of Buddhist, Hindu, Muslim, or other religious groups' beliefs)

Six, one could deny the lack of  intervention is deliberate, and posit it is unintentional. But that seems to imply some kind of weakness or obstacle to God. And if the obstacle is not in God (as a greater will mentioned above) or in the things God created (human free will, also mentioned above), then it implies something else has power God cannot or will not overcome. This could be said to be an evil rational being of some non-human kind (like the devil), or some force (like chaos), but not some other God of the same kind as we posited, since there cannot be two "Greatest and Unequaled" beings; whatever would make them different would be a defect. And if we keep the God we have mentioned so far the same, then only the newly-posited "god" would have defects, and thus be utterly deficient compared to the One God. Further, the rational obstacle (devil) is a creature, and could be done away with or moved elsewhere more easily than we flick an ant away, and the force (chaos) is not truly a thing, but a non-thing; the absence of order. And how is God to fight absence except by filling all things with Itself? (Though human minds seem to be their own universes, in a sense, and it seems God requires human permission to enter before God is able to fill the human mind. This, of course, is reminiscent of many saying about faith, prayer, and purification through ascetic discipline and works. But this is basically the free-will thing from "Two".)

Seven, one could deny there are really obstacles that prevent people from ultimately becoming their best selves. This is effectively universalism, as it implies also that therefore all people really do become, eventually, those best selves. I hope this is true. One might argue that the objection doesn't necessarily require all to eventually become their best selves, only that they not be prevented from doing so. This can be taken two ways. One is to say then that our own will is the "bad thing", the obstacle, but this is hardly a line of reasoning that can be followed long, since it leads to denial of free will, and with it, rationality and personhood and humanity. The other is to say that those who, in the end, end up in a bad state of affairs, being always something less than their best self, tormented by the nagging conscience and perfection of those who do reach such a pinnacle of personhood, are only those who choose such a thing, and thus that it is a power given to us by God to become the little gods of our own minds and lock God out if we wish. (Since God is the sustainer of being, and thus to fail to become our most complete self is to incompletely allow God into our own self.) This is, again, the argument of "Two", above.

Eight, one could say God is justified in allowing bad things because we deserve them. No one, such an objector would say, is innocent in the way claimed. This seems flatly absurd, since it makes God considerably less merciful (which seems to be a part of loving) than most people, and altogether unjust towards infants. Further, while some bad things may be for our correction, if not all things lead us to ultimate correction of self into our best self, either "Sixth" of "Seventh", above, is true; namely that regardless of the justice of punishments God may or may not allow, either all are ultimately made into their best self (in which case all punishments were merely corrective to get us there) or else the punishments are not universally therapeutic, and some remain locked into themselves. Some might say that God actually wills to punish us for what we have done, but this seems entirely contradictory to the claim inherent in the question that God desires we become our best selves, especially if the punishment is done with no purpose toward that goal. Otherwise, it is a competing will, as in "One", above.

In summary (taking out the "dead end" choices), God may have higher priorities, be unable to stop our actions from having consequences if we are free, or actually end up making us all our best selves so it's "worth it".

While most deny the last option (and some question whether it can even make sense to say we have free will--which means we don't have to necessarily choose anything--and yet we all necessarily choose to become our best self, evenetually), and the first option seems inscrutable, because there could seemingly be myriad competing "wills" in God, and we might never know them, or at least this is imagined to be so (though it seems that if God's one Act is to sustain all beings, which is to say God loves all beings, then it is not at all apparent how from that same on Act some other, radically different will could be drived...), many find the second option appealing. Yet there are further objections.

Why, if free human actions are the causes of bad things, doesn't God prevent them? (Let's imagine for right now that natural disasters are the result of past human actions or other rational beings' actions.) There are four potential ways God could do so, and all can be ruled out in turn.

First, God could stop the cause in the person before they act. But this would be to remove our own free will and self-control of our minds, making us non-persons, but rather, robots.

Second, God could stop the effect from the person. Imagine ridicule comes out as silence from the mouth of some angry person, or a knife simply vanishes from the would-be-attacker's hands. The laws of nature have now become utterly unpredicable. Rather than inspiring change, it would probably unimaginably confuse us, since people make a lot of mistakes on a daily basis, all of which may contribute to the demise of others in some way, however obscurely and remotely. It took humanity long enough to understand the world to the level we do now, which is still incomplete--we never would discover laws of nature if they were constantly being broken. And one might say, "but God could invent or have the same effect as the life-saving things we have now to make up for that problem". But that almost would make us each in our own little bubble of God's protection and puppeteering, incapable of being a person, much less a human in a physical body, in any meaningful way. This seems like a rather pyrrhic victory.

Third, God could stop the cause in the victim, but this would basically be again to bubble us in, and presents all the same problems. Further, if God has one Act to sustain all beings, God would have to "change the Act" constantly, affecting everything wildly--something which seems impossible or hardly worthy of the Eternal, Perfect Creator.

Fourth and finally, God could prevent the effect of the bad action in us from, well, being bad. But again, this would be manipulation of our thoughts unless it was voluntary. But if it's voluntary, then God isn't totally able to prevent the bad things altogether, which is what's being discussed.

So, in summary:

I posit that God made us free beings, and wants us to become our best selves, but due to human actions, often very bad things happen to people. God permits this, then, because He has "tied His own hands", so to speak, in choosing to make us. Though I hope it turns out we all become our best selves, someday.

Stillness

The Way is the Divine Reason of the Cosmos

"There are ways,

but The Way is uncharted;

there are names,

but not nature in words:

nameless indeed 

is the Source of creation

but things have a mother

and she has a name.

___

The secret waits 

for the insight

of eyes unclouded

by longing;

those who are bound

by desire

see only 

the outward container.

___

These two come paired

but distinct 

by their names.

Of all things

profound,

say that their pairing

is deepest,

the gate to the root

of the world."

--Tao Te Ching I

(tr. R. B. Blakney)